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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The standard view of patents is that—while they incentivize innovation— 
they tend to dampen competition.1  Specifically, by providing their holders 
with the possibility of market power over patented products, patents often 
result in supracompetitive pricing, shutting out consumers who otherwise 
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 **  Professor and Faculty Director, Law, Business & Entrepreneurship Program, 
University of Washington School of Law.  We thank Shubha Ghosh, Wendy Gordon, 
Justin Hughes, Rob Merges, Adam Moore, Neil Netanel, Randal Picker, and Lisa Ramsey, as 
well as participants at the Philosophical Foundations of Intellectual Property conference 
at the University of San Diego School of Law and the Intellectual Property Scholars 
2012 conference at Stanford Law School for their helpful comments.  We also thank Rey 
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 1. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1031, 1058–59 (2005). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2126944
49-4 SICHELMAN AND O'CONNOR (DO NOT DELETE) 3/22/2013  9:31 AM 
 
1268 
would have purchased the patented products in a competitive market.2  
The “embarrassment” of these “monopolies” and their concomitant 
consumer deadweight losses is tolerated in exchange for compensating 
inventors for the risks and costs that they and their investors bear, which (in 
theory) promotes innovation and, hence, economic growth.3 
Yet, the historical genesis of the patent system turns on quite a different 
economic story.  A key assumption of today’s standard account is that, 
absent patent protection, products would generally be sold in a competitive 
market.4  However, the first regularized patent system appeared during the 
Renaissance in the Venetian Republic, which was a highly regulated 
economy.5  In the Venetian economy, many types of products—particularly, 
artisanal or technological products6—could typically be produced and 
sold only by artisan and merchant guilds.  One important exception to the 
 
 2. Supernormal profits may arise through either an increase in price or a decrease 
in the cost of producing the good or service.  See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 298 
(2003); JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES § 2.15 (2d 
ed. 2011). 
 3. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: BEING HIS AUTOBIOGRAPHY, CORRESPONDENCE, REPORTS, 
MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, AND OTHER WRITINGS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE 175, 181 (H.A. 
Washington ed., 1854). 
 4. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 1, at 1059, 1072. 
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. The concept and term technology as we use it today did not arise until after 
the Renaissance.  See Technology Definition, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed. 
com (last visited Oct. 4, 2012) (subscription required) (search “Quick Search” for 
“technology”; then follow “Go” hyperlink; then follow “Full entry” hyperlink) (showing 
that the modern senses of the term were not used until the seventeenth century and that 
when the term was used earlier it was only in the sense of a treatise on grammar).  
Further, even its common modern sense does not map onto all of the “mechanical arts” 
of the Renaissance, which often included some of what today we would call the “fine 
arts” such as painting, sculpture, and architecture.  See Paul Oskar Kristeller, The 
Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics (I), 12 J. HIST. IDEAS 
496, 510–21 (1951) (arguing that the visual arts of painting, sculpture, and architecture 
were only just beginning to be separated out from the mechanical arts by commentators 
in sixteenth century Venice and beyond).  By contrast, all of these activities were known 
by the general term arts up through the nineteenth century, even after the term 
technology had been introduced for narrow purposes.  See Art, n.1 Definition, OXFORD 
ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com (last visited Oct. 4, 2012) (subscription required) 
(search “Quick Search” for “art”; then follow “Go” hyperlink; then follow “art, n.1” 
hyperlink; then follow “Full entry” hyperlink); see also 1 JACOB BIGELOW, THE USEFUL 
ARTS, CONSIDERED IN CONNEXION WITH THE APPLICATIONS OF SCIENCE 13 (Harper & 
Brothers 1855) (1840) (using the terms arts and useful arts to designate what we today 
would refer to as technology or technological arts); JACOB BIGELOW, ELEMENTS OF 
TECHNOLOGY, at iv (2d ed. 1831) (attempting to introduce the term technology to cover 
the useful arts).  Accordingly, we will use the term arts throughout to signify all of these 
artisanal and “technological” activities. 
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guilds’ monopolies were “patents,”7 which initially provided non-guild 
members—particularly foreigners—the privilege of being able to sell 
products and practice methods that were otherwise within the sole province 
of the guilds.  Thus, the original patents were not negative rights to exclude, 
as today, but positive privileges or licenses to practice. 
Soon, these positive privileges were accompanied by—at least in some 
instances—an express negative right to exclude.8  We speculate that this 
development was because of one or both of two reasons.  First, the 
economic power of the guilds may have allowed them to de facto exclude 
the non-guild artisans despite the latter’s license or privilege.9  Accordingly, 
the naked privilege or license to make and sell artisanal products was not 
enough to empower the non-guild artisan to establish a fair beachhead in 
the relevant market.  Second, a bare license—without exclusionary rights— 
allowed the guilds to appropriate without compensation any inventive 
technologies introduced by an outsider artisan.  If the artisan’s products 
exposed the underlying invention, a mere license to compete with the 
guilds might not have been, at least in many instances, terribly valuable. 
Thus, over time, the exclusionary right became standard in the patent 
grant.  Yet, the positive privilege to practice—at least in those product 
areas occupied by the guilds—never ceased to accompany the exclusionary 
right.  This was because, without such a positive right in a heavily regulated 
economy such as that of Renaissance Venice, it would be illegal for the 
artisan to make and sell the products.  Unlike today’s patent systems—
which solely encompass negative rights to exclude against the backdrop 
of a generally free market—the Venetian patent system provided a dual 
right, part of which allowed the patent holder to compete in an otherwise 
regulated system dominated by the guilds. 
Directly contrary to the view that patents tend to diminish competition, 
patents in the Venetian Republic arguably enabled a new kind of 
 
 7. Here we do not necessarily mean modern utility patents, but the early versions 
of litterae patente that were “open letters” of the sovereign providing certain rights or 
privileges to the recipient.  See, e.g., CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM, 1660–1800, at 10 (1988) (quoting 2 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *346). 
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 28–46. 
 9. For example, the guilds could have pressured customers not to buy from the 
non-guild artisans, similar to anticompetitive business tactics of today.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58–64 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that Microsoft’s 
restrictions in its Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) licenses unfairly limited 
third-party web browser firms such as Netscape from accessing the OEM personal 
computer market). 
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competition from outside of the guild system.  This insight is important 
for two reasons.  First, it is critical to understanding the historical genesis 
of the patent system, as well as the changes it underwent as it migrated 
from the Venetian Republic to the very different economic systems in other 
European countries, such as the Netherlands, France, and England, and 
later the United States.  For instance, the insight may help explain how the 
“novelty” and “ingenuity” requirements for patenting in Venice were more 
vigorous in practice than the significantly relaxed “substantial novelty” 
requirement in the English system.10  While the British system developed 
from the need to bring in existing arts and artisans from the Continent to 
train British apprentices, the Venetian system developed in what was then 
the leading artisanal capital of Renaissance Europe.  Therefore, in the 
Venetian system, the guilds actively policed patent applications, and the 
patent authorities worked in concert with the guilds to reject those 
applications for putative inventions that were already known to guild 
members and, apparently, for those inventions that could easily be made by 
a guild artisan based on existing art.  In England, however, little to no 
such pressure existed, resulting perhaps in a system with fewer hurdles 
in practice to patentability. 
Second, although patents today nominally provide negative rights to 
exclude, in effect, they often provide effective positive privileges to 
practice.  Specifically, the “defensive” attributes of patents can prevent 
lawsuits from other patent holders, providing a de facto “freedom to 
operate” where none exists de jure.11  Relatedly, startups and small 
companies can sometimes leverage the “offensive” attributes of patents to 
enter markets otherwise dominated by incumbents.12  Indeed, in some 
industries, the incumbents—taken as a group—act as guilds of sorts, 
dominating production and sales.13  To an extent, patents may allow 
outsiders to break the grip of these modern-day guilds by offering what 
Judge Jerome Frank has termed a “slingshot” for the small company 
“David” against the big company “Goliath.”14  In this sense, the challenge 
 
 10. See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 11. See Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1065 (2008). 
 12. See id. 
 13. Cf. Robert P. Merges, From Medieval Guilds to Open Source Software: 
Informal Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation (Nov. 13, 2004) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (suggesting that certain features of medieval 
and Renaissance guilds appear in patent pools and standard-setting organizations). 
 14. Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 643 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., 
concurring) (“The threat from patent monopolies in the hands of such ‘outsiders’ may 
create a sort of competition—a David versus Goliath competition—which reduces the 
inertia of some huge industrial aggregations that might otherwise be sluggish.”); see also 
Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the 
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to the traditional view of patents-as-competition-dampeners is not only 
pertinent to historical accounts but also to the functioning—and our 
understanding—of the patent system today. 
Part II of this Article describes the artisan and merchant guild systems 
of the Venetian Republic.  Part III explores the emergence of the patent 
system as a means for foreigners and Venetian citizens to compete with 
the guilds, as well as the eventual addition of negative exclusive rights to 
the basic license form of positive patent privileges.  In so doing, contrary 
to the speculation of some scholars, we reject with near certainty the 
contention that the first patent law statute granting exclusionary rights 
for—in modern parlance—technological inventions was a silk-specific 
directive enacted by the Venetian Grand Council in the late fourteenth or 
early fifteenth century.  Rather, the first record of a patent grant with 
exclusionary rights for such inventions is one by the Venetian Senate in 
1416, and the first patent law statute was the Venetian Patent Act of 1474 
(the 1474 Act).15  Part IV then considers the ramifications of patenting 
against the backdrop of a regulated economy.  First, it explains how the 
evolution of patent laws in the West likely depended on the migration of 
the patent system from the highly regulated economy of Venice to less 
regulated economies in Europe.  Second, it provides some reflections and 
lessons for the role of patents in today’s economy, showing that—like in 
the days of the Venetian Republic—patents can still function to promote 
competition. 
II.  THE ARTISAN GUILDS OF THE VENETIAN REPUBLIC 
In 1173, the Venetian Republic passed legislation to formalize the 
relations between the State and the informal trade associations of specialist 
artisans and merchants.16  After 1173, the government officially policed the 
activities of the now-formalized guilds.17  Although many types of guilds 
emerged in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, of import here were the 
arti—working guilds whose province was roughly the “useful arts,” as 
 
Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1577, 1585–87 (2009); Stephen H. 
Haber et al., On the Importance to Economic Success of Property Rights in Finance and 
Innovation, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 222 (2008) (“[P]atents are powerful antimonopoly 
weapons—the vital slingshots ‘Davids’ use to take on ‘Goliaths.’”). 
 15. See infra text accompanying notes 45–50. 
 16. RICHARD J. GOY, VENETIAN VERNACULAR ARCHITECTURE: TRADITIONAL HOUSING 
IN THE VENETIAN LAGOON 91 (1989). 
 17. See id. 
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that term was used many centuries later in the United States.18  Those 
arti focused on a particular craft such as shipbuilding, glassmaking, and 
woolworking grew fairly rapidly in the first half of the thirteenth century 
and, pursuant to a statute enacted in 1261, became subject to even closer 
state regulation.19  Under this 1261 statute, guilds codified their internal 
rules and, once approved by the State, these rules became legally binding 
“statutes” regulating the guilds.20  Typically, these statutes maintained 
guild knowledge as trade secrets, often with severe punishment for 
violations.21 
Of particular importance, the arti were granted exclusive rights by the 
State to practice the “mechanical trades.”22  Thus, ordinary citizens could 
not, for instance, practice woolworking, glassmaking, or shipbuilding 
without the blessing of one of the appropriate guilds.23  In effect, any 
inventions created by guild members or anybody outside the guilds were 
subject to the effective monopoly rights of the guilds, such that the guilds 
enjoyed the exclusive ability to practice these inventions in their relevant 
artisanal domains.24  These monopoly rights were supplemented by the 
trade secrecy regimes enforced by the guilds and sanctioned by the State.  
Hence, these practices effectively obviated the need for separate patents 
providing exclusionary rights to the guilds. 
 
 18. See id. at 91–92.  The main difference is that what we would separate out today 
as the visual arts components of the fine arts—painting, sculpture, and architecture—
were generally included in these useful or mechanical arts.  See supra note 6; see also 
GOY, supra note 16, at 99 (discussing the various lesser arti and elaborating that “the 
guild of painters embraced every type of painting from the simple decoration of wall 
surfaces to the great fresco works of Tiepolo and the canvases of Titian and Tintoretto”). 
 19. See GOY, supra note 16, at 91–92. 
 20. See id. at 92. 
 21. See PAMELA O. LONG, OPENNESS, SECRECY, AUTHORSHIP: TECHNICAL ARTS 
AND THE CULTURE OF KNOWLEDGE FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE RENAISSANCE 88–92 (2001) 
[hereinafter LONG, OPENNESS]; Pamela O. Long, Invention, Authorship, “Intellectual 
Property,” and the Origin of Patents: Notes Toward a Conceptual History, 32 TECH. & 
CULTURE 846, 873 (1991) [hereinafter Long, Conceptual History]; Francesca Trivellato, 
Guilds, Technology, and Economic Change in Early Modern Venice, in GUILDS, 
INNOVATION, AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY, 1400–1800, at 199, 223 (S.R. Epstein & 
Maarten Prak eds., 2008). 
 22. GOY, supra note 16, at 93–94.  These trades were also more commonly known as 
the mechanical arts in the Renaissance.  See supra note 6.  The term trade can be confusing in 
that it was historically used for both commercial trading—or merchant—activities as well as 
skilled artisanal crafts.  See Trade, n. Definition, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www. 
oed.com (last visited Oct. 4, 2012) (subscription required) (search “Quick Search” for “trade”; 
then follow “Go” hyperlink; then follow “trade, n.” hyperlink; then follow “Full entry” 
hyperlink).  Here Goy uses trade in the latter sense. 
 23. See GOY, supra note 16, at 94. 
 24. Often, multiple guilds would share exclusive rights to make and sell particular 
crafts.  See Trivellato, supra note 21, at 221–22.  Thus, at least early on, the guild system 
functioned as an oligopoly rather than a monopoly.  Id. at 224–25.  Over the years, 
overlapping guilds often merged into true monopolist guilds.  See id. at 218. 
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This meant that anybody outside the guilds who innovated needed 
approval by the appropriate guild to practice and sell their inventions.  
Foreign nationals were particularly burdened by this result because they 
were generally forbidden from becoming members of the guilds, at least 
without extended residence in the Republic.25  However, at least in some 
guilds, if a foreigner was qualified to practice an art in another region, he 
could apply to the guild for approval to work his craft in the Republic, 
so long as he paid an appropriate registration fee.26  It is unclear from the 
available records if this practice was the case in all the guilds—particularly 
after the early fourteenth century, during which time the Republic became 
“increasingly hostile” to foreigners.27  Regardless of foreigners’ ability 
to gain entry into the relevant guild to practice their art, presumably at 
least some foreigners wanted to forgo the restrictions placed upon them 
by the guilds.  As the next Part of the Article describes, the need of the 
Republic to recruit foreign artisans, coupled with their inability—or, at least, 
reluctance—to comply with guild rules, provided the impetus for the 
genesis of the patent system. 
III.  THE EMERGENCE OF PATENT PRIVILEGES AGAINST                                       
THE BACKDROP OF THE GUILDS 
Partly responsible for the supervision of the guilds was the Provveditori 
di Comun (Commissioners of the Commune), particularly for the wool 
and silk industries and a number of lesser guilds.28  The Provveditori di 
Comun was also partly in charge of the naturalization of foreigners.29  
Apparently in need of foreign artisans and their technology—and effectively 
 
 25. See id. at 222 (“Patents were also instruments to bypass guild monopolies.  
Barred from Venetian guilds, foreigners—including artisans and entrepreneurs from 
other Italian states as well as Germans, French, Dutch, and English—often used them 
with this goal in mind.”); see also STANLEY BOORMAN, OTTAVIANO PETRUCCI: CATALOGUE 
RAISONNE 28 (2006); GOY, supra note 16, at 97. 
 26. See GOY, supra note 16, at 97.  In some cases, foreigners were allowed a grace 
period—for example, eight days—in which they could work in Venice without guild 
approval.  See id. at 99. 
 27. Gerhard Rösch, The Serrata of the Great Council and Venetian Society, 1286–1323, 
in VENICE RECONSIDERED: THE HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION OF AN ITALIAN CITY-STATE, 1297–
1797, at 67, 82 (John Martin & Dennis Romano eds., 2000). 
 28. SATYA DATTA, WOMEN AND MEN IN EARLY MODERN VENICE: REASSESSING 
HISTORY 45 (2003).  The main supervisory power over all the guilds lay with the Giustizia 
Vecchia.  See GOY, supra note 16, at 91–92; Long, Conceptual History, supra note 21, at 871. 
 29. See E. NATALIE ROTHMAN, BROKERING EMPIRE: TRANS-IMPERIAL SUBJECTS 
BETWEEN VENICE AND ISTANBUL 43 n.46 (2012). 
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contravening the monopoly rights of the guilds—the Grand Council (likely 
in concert with the Provveditori di Comun) granted licenses for building 
various kinds of mills and dredging machines to individuals outside of 
the guilds, typically foreigners, starting in the early thirteenth century and 
continuing through the fifteenth century.30  Of course, such a license would 
only allow the licensee to compete alongside the guilds, but would not 
prevent the guilds from appropriating the licensee’s invention, if feasible.31 
Presumably, foreigners complained of such appropriation of their 
inventions by the guilds and petitioned the government for not only a 
positive privilege to compete with the guilds, but also for exclusionary 
rights over any inventions they might bring to the Republic.  According 
to some scholars, the earliest documentary evidence of a law granting such 
exclusionary rights is a silk-specific directive from the late fourteenth or 
early fifteenth century that was supposedly issued by the Grand Council: 
If somebody invents any machine or process to speed up silk-making or to 
improve it, and if the idea is actually useful, the inventor can obtain an 
exclusive privilege from [the Provveditori di Comun].32 
The original source of this putative directive is from Carlo Antonio Marin’s 
1800 treatise on the commercial history of the Venetian Republic.  
Unfortunately, Marin does not quote the original language of this apparent 
directive and fails to cite to the original document evidencing as much in 
the Venetian Archives.33  Frank Prager and others have relied on the 
 
 30. See Long, Conceptual History, supra note 21, at 877; Frank D. Prager, A History of 
Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787, 26 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 711, 713–14 (1944).  Another 
example of such a license is from 1297, when the Grand Council passed a law allowing non-
guild physicians to make their own medicines in secret and sell them through licensed shops 
without interference from the guilds.  See Long, Conceptual History, supra note 21, at 876.  
This law seems to have been directed at local physicians because it does not mention 
foreigners, as does the later 1474 Act, and hence does not seem to have been directed at luring 
foreigners. 
 31. As Frank Prager aptly notes: 
Whoever proposed a new technology needed, in the first place, a specially 
created power or license to infringe existing guild monopolies by making, 
selling or using the new invention.  Such specially created rights were called 
privileges.  They were not, originally, exclusive rights.  They were granted and 
revoked by the state, depending on what was deemed to be useful. 
Prager, supra note 30, at 714. 
 32. F.D. Prager, The Early Growth and Influence of Intellectual Property, 34 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 106, 130–32 (1952) (citing 5 CARLO ANTONIO MARIN, STORIA CIVILE E 
POLITICA DEL COMMERCIO DE’VENEZIANI 158, 256 (1800)). 
 33. MARIN, supra note 32, at 258 (“C. inventasse qualche macchina od artifizio per 
agevolare o perfezionare i lavori di seta: provata ehe sia con l’effetto la promessa utilità 
dell’ uno o dell’altro; possa l’inventore ottener privilegio esclusivo per anni 10 accordatogli 
per li Provveditori di Comun.”).  Giulio Mandich remarks that he searched for the 
directive in the Archives but could not find it.  Giulio Mandich, Venetian Origins of 
Inventor’s Rights, 42 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 378, 378–79 (1960). 
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language of the Marin treatise, along with other evidence showing that 
the bulk of Venetian silk regulations were enacted between 1390 and 
1410,34 as support for the view that Marin was paraphrasing a silk-specific 
patent law directive from the late fourteenth or early fifteenth century, 
nearly 100 years before the passage of the Venetian Patent Act of 1474.35 
Based on our extensive research at the Venetian State Archives, we can 
now say with near certainty that Marin was referring to the 1474 Act, 
and that no such silk-specific patent law directive was ever issued.  Several 
reasons support such a view.  First, before the relevant section containing 
the passage cited by Prager and others, Marin explicitly states that he is 
describing silk-related laws and directives of the Senate, Major Council, 
and other governmental departments found in the Capitolare records of 
the Provveditori di Comun, and not the records of the Senate or Grand 
Council per se.36  Indeed, upon our review of the entire Capitolare, all of the 
nonpatent laws and directives Marin described in the relevant section of 
his treatise can be found in those records. 
The only patent-related directive in the Capitolare is the 1474 Act, 
passed by the Senate.37  We believe that Marin mistakenly attributed this 
Act to the Grand Council instead of the Senate, because adjacent laws 
and directives in the Capitolare were passed by the Grand Council, and 
the relevant citation in the Capitolare does not clearly indicate that the law 
was passed by the Senate.38  Moreover, some of the language in the 1474 
Act itself could be read out of context to indicate that it was passed by the 
Grand Council.39  As for the silk-specific nature of Marin’s description, it 
seems reasonable to believe that Marin was simply noting in the silk-
specific section of his treatise that, in the context of silk production, 
inventions in that field could be protected by patents.  In other words, 
Marin did not mean to imply that the Act described in the Capitolare was 
limited to silk inventions.  Much of the particular language Marin used 
 
 34. See Prager, supra note 32, at 131 n.34 (citing 1 VETTOR SANDI, PRINCIPJ DI 
STORIA CIVILE DELLA REPUBBLICA DI VENEZIA 754 (1772)). 
 35. See id. at 131–32. 
 36. MARIN, supra note 32, at 256–58. 
 37. Archivio Stato di Venezia [ASV], Provveditori di Comun, Capitolare (1272–
1600), b.1, c.89r-v. 
 38. See id. at c.87r-90v. 
 39. See id. at c.89r-v (“Andara parte che p[er] auctorita de questo Cons[elo] . . . .”) 
(emphasis added).  In English, the relevant clause reads: “Be it enacted that, by the 
authority of this Council . . . .”  Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450–1550), 30 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 166, 177 (1948) (emphasis added). 
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(for example, “artifizio,” “perfezionare,” “utilità”) can be found directly 
in the 1474 Act, and he specifically mentions that the patents are granted by 
the Provveditori di Comun for a period of ten years.40  Second, although the 
Provveditori di Comun did issue patents without Senatorial approval, 
the only examples of such rely on the authority of the 1474 Act.  In this 
regard, we agree with the findings of Luca Molà that the Provveditori 
di Comun could issue ten-year patents under the 1474 Act, but patents 
of longer term needed Senatorial approval.41  However, there is no 
indication in the record that the Provveditori di Comun had authority prior 
to the 1474 Act to issue patents on its own accord.42  Although many 
documents relating to the Provveditori di Comun have been destroyed, 
all of the legislative acts relating to that governmental department—which 
was founded in the early fourteenth century—are extant.43  In a careful 
review of these documents, we found no law enacted by the Grand Council 
or the Senate prior to 1474 formally providing the Provveditori di Comun 
any patent-granting authority for silk-related inventions or otherwise.44 
In sum, we believe there is very strong evidence to rebut Prager’s and 
others’ interpretations of Marin’s treatise that the first exclusionary 
patent rights for what we would today label “technological” inventions 
appeared in a directive limited to silk inventions passed in the late 
fourteenth or early fifteenth century.  Rather, the first evidence of such 
exclusionary rights appears in 1416, when Ser Franciscus Petri, from 
Rhodes, was granted a patent by the Grand Council of Venice45 for his 
device for fulling wool (that is, turning it into felt).46  Notably, Petri was 
a foreigner and there is no evidence that he himself was the inventor of the 
device.47  But he was awarded the patent because the pestles on his device 
“‘full thus perfectly, better than the fullers existing in the waters surrounding’ 
 
 40. MARIN, supra note 32, at 258. 
 41. LUCA MOLÀ, SILK INDUSTRY OF RENAISSANCE VENICE 188 (2000). 
 42. Specifically, we reviewed all of the ten-year patents issued directly by the 
Provveditori di Comun—except one we could not locate—examined by Molà.  See id. at 
app. B. 
 43. See Provveditori di Comun, supra note 37. 
 44. See id. 
 45. LONG, OPENNESS, supra note 21, at 94. 
 46. ASV, Maggior Consiglio, Deliberazioni, Feb. 20, 1415, r.22, c.7, sub 20; see 
also Long, Conceptual History, supra note 21, at 877; Mandich, supra note 33, at 379 
n.6.  The patent term was fifty years.  See Long, Conceptual History, supra note 21, at 
877.  In this regard, note that the Venetian year began on March 1; therefore, February 
20, 1415, would have been February 20, 1416, under our calendar system.  See MARINO 
SANUDO, VENICE, CITÀ EXCELENTISSIMA: SELECTIONS FROM THE RENAISSANCE DIARIES 
OF MARIN SANUDO, at xxii (Patricia H. Labalme & Laura Sanguineti White eds., Linda L. 
Carroll trans., 2008). 
 47. See LONG, OPENNESS, supra note 21, at 94. 
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the Rialto.”48  Petri’s possession of the device and the know-how to make 
and use it appears to have been sufficient impetus for the Grand Council 
to issue him the patent.49 
Perhaps exclusionary patent grants were issued on a “customary” (that 
is, a non-statutory) basis without participation by the Senate in the early 
fifteenth or even late fourteenth century.  Unfortunately, it appears that all 
of the early records regarding Venetian patents, other than those granted 
by the Grand Council and the Senate, have been lost or destroyed, so it is 
likely impossible to confirm or deny such a proposition.50  Of course, this 
lacuna leaves an evidentiary gap of potentially monumental proportion, 
and it is not until 1444 that the next patent appears in the extant record.51  
Several more grants are in the available record through the adoption of 
the 1474 Act, in which, inter alia, the Provveditori di Comun was given 
authority by the Senate to grant patents for novelty, ingenuity, and utility 
in apparently all artisanal fields.52 
Despite the prominent gaps in the record, it is sufficient to draw several 
important inferences, albeit ones that are somewhat speculative in nature.  
Specifically, the earliest patent laws were positive privileges that allowed 
foreigners to practice their crafts with immunity from guild monopolies.  
These laws were adopted by the Grand Council and implemented by the 
Provveditori di Comun, apparently in response to the problems foreigners 
experienced in delivering innovative new products in the face of guild 
prerogatives—particularly, foreigners’ difficulties in obtaining the 
imprimatur of the guilds to practice their crafts in the Republic.  Eventually, 
 
 48. Id. (quoting translation in Mandich, supra note 33, at 379 n.6 with minor changes). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See ASV, Index 87, Provveditori di Comun, at 2 (showing that the first “Atti,” 
which contain the examination records, begin in 1518, and the first “Scritture,” which 
also contain examination records, begin in 1562); Interview with Michela del Borgo, 
Former Dir., Archivio Stato di Venezia, in Venice, It. (June 2011) (noting that many of 
the patent records were destroyed when the French occupied Venice starting in 1796).  
Moreover, all of the loose files (filza) of the Provveditori di Comun, which contained 
numerous patent-related records, are no longer extant.  See ASV, Index 87, Provveditori 
di Comun. 
 51. Mandich, supra note 33, at 379. 
 52. See Ted Sichelman & Toni Veneri, A Proper Interpretation of the Venetian 
Patent Act of 1474 (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors); cf. Long, 
Conceptual History, supra note 21, at 878; Mandich, supra note 39, at 177.  In practice, 
following the 1474 Act, the Senate retained granting authority for all “customary law” 
patents—typically, those with terms longer than ten years—and the Provveditori di 
Comun had the authority to grant “statutory law” patents for terms of ten years.  See 
Sichelman & Veneri, supra. 
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patents were coupled with exclusionary rights when foreigners—and, 
eventually, domestic subjects—presented sufficiently useful inventions to 
the governmental authorities.53  The first documentary evidence of this 
process is the patent grant to Petri in 1416.54  There is no documentary 
evidence that the Grand Council ever passed a patent statute limited to silk 
in the late fourteenth or early fifteenth century.  Rather, the first evidence of 
any general patent statute—namely, one covering more than a single patent 
grant—is the 1474 Act, when the Senate formally conferred authority on 
the Provveditori di Comun to grant patents for a term of ten years, but 
retained its customary pre-1474 power to grant patents of longer duration. 
IV.  RECONCEIVING THE HISTORY AND FUNCTION OF PATENTS 
These findings have important ramifications for our understanding of 
the historical underpinnings of patent law, as well as our theoretical 
understanding of the role of patents.  First, the earliest patent laws were 
very likely a reaction by the Venetian government—apparently the 
Provveditori di Comun and Grand Council—to the inability or reluctance of 
foreigners to come to terms with the working guilds.  By providing positive 
privileges for foreigners—and, later, domestic artisans—to work alongside 
the guilds, patents actively promoted competition.  Moreover, by coupling 
these privileges with negative exclusionary rights, the patent system 
provided for a government-administered, case-by-case means for promoting 
innovation, which stood in substantial contrast to the guild-dominated, 
trade-secret-oriented system that provided exclusive privileges over entire 
artisanal fields.  Furthermore, unlike trade secrets of indefinite duration—
and although the Venetian system did not explicitly provide for disclosure 
of patented inventions through publication—it was understood that the 
working of an invention in the Republic would very likely teach other 
artisans how to practice it, often in the form of apprentices who worked for 
the inventing artisan and then carried the invention forward in their own 
work.55  This system would effectively enable others to use the invention 
at the end of the patent term. 
 
 53. See Mandich, supra note 33, at 378–81 (indicating that the first Venetian 
patent awarded to a domestic inventor was in 1470); Mandich, supra note 39, at 172–75.  
By the end of the fifteenth century, the vast majority of patents were being granted to 
Venetians.  See infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 54. See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text. 
 55. See LONG, OPENNESS, supra note 21, at 93; Carlo Marco Belfanti, Guilds, 
Patents, and the Circulation of Technical Knowledge: Northern Italy During the Early 
Modern Age, 45 TECH. & CULTURE 569, 578 (2004) (arguing that patents worked in 
tandem with the secrecy of the guilds, in that the former were issued to introduce arts or 
devices unknown to the local guilds with the expectation that the art or device would 
then be assimilated into the local guilds). 
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The adoption of the patent system in Venice allowed in many senses 
for the “democratization” of invention, diminishing the power of the guilds 
and increasing the power of independent inventors.56  Historians have 
debated the precise stance and relationship of the guilds to the patent 
system, but it remains clear that the guilds did help police the granting of the 
patents.57  For example, Luca Molà recounts in detail how the guilds—at 
least in some cases—opined on the novelty of pending applications, as well 
as two episodes in which the guilds vigorously sought to revoke already 
issued patents, apparently on lack of novelty grounds.58  One of us has 
opined elsewhere that the rise of the patent system in Venice was in part a 
means for the State to reduce the power of the guilds—in particular, by 
essentially bribing or incenting individual guild members to disclose their 
inventions in exchange for these valuable new patent rights that could be 
enforced through state powers.59 
Taking into account at least some guild opposition to patents potentially 
elucidates the genesis and evolution of patent doctrine as it migrated from 
the Venetian Republic to the very different economic systems of other 
European countries, including England, and later to the United States.  
Although we are still undertaking further review of the substantive 
requirements for patenting in the Venetian Republic, the strong guild 
presence there may help to explain why the Venetian requirements of 
novelty and ingenuity had more bite than the oft-termed “substantial 
novelty” requirement in England.60  Specifically, it appears the Venetian 
guilds could be relied upon to innovate as “ordinary artisans,” so to speak, 
whereas in England such ordinary innovation was not so commonplace.  
Thus, it is not surprising that the Venetian guilds appeared to actively 
 
 56. Cf. B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND 
COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790–1920 (2005) (describing how 
the nineteenth century American patent system enlarged the set of inventors who could 
obtain legal rights to their inventions). 
 57. Cf. Long, Conceptual History, supra note 21, at 881 (“Early Venetian patents 
often awarded monopolies to outsiders in ways that cannot have been favorable to native 
guildsmen.” (footnote omitted)). 
 58. MOLÀ, supra note 41, at 199–201 (“The Provveditori di Comun, as they frequently 
did, asked guild authorities for their opinion on the matter.”). 
 59. Sean M. O’Connor, The Central Role of Law as a Meta Method in Creativity 
and Entrepreneurship, in CREATIVITY, LAW AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 87, 101–03 (Shubha 
Ghosh & Robin Paul Mallory eds., 2011). 
 60. See John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. 
L. REV. 1, 18, 23–32 (2007) (discussing the genesis of the substantial novelty doctrine in 
English patent law). 
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oppose patent applications for putative inventions not only known to them 
but also those that they would have invented in the ordinary course. 
In England, however, patents operated without the omnipresent 
background of monopolist artisan guilds, which possessed and sustained 
artisanal knowledge, at least by the time a true patent system began to 
take hold there in the mid- to late seventeenth century.61  The focus of the 
English patent system was primarily on the importation of artisanal 
practices and their related goods that were well-established on the Continent, 
whereas Venetian patents—at least by the early sixteenth century—were 
primarily awarded to domestic inventors for truly novel and ingenious arts 
or machines.62  As early as 1331, the English Crown granted patents to 
the first importers of artisanal practices and goods not available in 
England.63  The Crown eventually granted patents to importers of inventions 
made abroad.64  Such a practice was not very different from the Venetian 
system, which examined novelty against the available—or potentially 
available—“prior art” solely in the Republic. 
Over time, however, the English system became corrupted through the 
grant of patents by the Crown to court favorites for ordinary goods already 
available in England, resulting in Parliament’s passage of the Statute of 
Monopolies in 1623.  The statute banned all monopoly grants except for 
those to the “true and first inventor” of “new manufactures within this 
realm.”65  Although the Statute of Monopolies sustained the privileges of 
the English guilds—and in many ways entrenched their power, especially 
for the merchant guilds66—it diminished the ability of the Crown to grant 
 
 61. See MARIA BROUWER, GOVERNANCE AND INNOVATION: A HISTORICAL VIEW 35–36 
(2008).  Although the Crown had issued patents for invention well before the Statute of 
Monopolies, the numbers are relatively few, and the English patent system did not take hold 
until the mid-seventeenth century, around the time when the craft guilds began to 
substantially decline in force.  See generally MACLEOD, supra note 7.  To be certain, there are 
some scattered examples of guild opposition in England to patents in the seventeenth century, 
but it appears this seemingly low level of opposition generally ceased by the eighteenth 
century.  See E. Wyndham Hulme, Privy Council Law and Practice of Letters Patent for 
Inventions from the Restoration to 1794 (pts. 1–2), 33 LAW Q. REV. 63, 180 (1917). 
 62. See ROBERTO BERVEGLIERI, INVENTORI STRANIERI A VENEZIA (1474–1788): 
IMPORTAZIONE DI TECNOLOGIA E CIRCOLAZIONE DI TECNICI ARTIGIANI INVENTORI: 
REPERTORIO 22 (1995) (showing that most patents were granted to Venetians from 1474 
onward). 
 63. See P.J. Federico, Origin and Early History of Patents, 11 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 
292, 293 (1929). 
 64. See id. 
 65. THOMAS G. FESSENDEN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW INVENTIONS 
218 (1810) (quoting Hornblower v. Boulton, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1285, 1288 (K.B.)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://books.google.com/books?id= 
aT8sAQAAMAAJ. 
 66. See generally Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics 
of Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1354 (2005).  Part of our speculation depends upon 
the difference between the artisan guilds and the merchant guilds.  Although the merchant 
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naked monopolies, and the rise of “economic liberalism” continued to 
weaken the remaining monopoly rights enjoyed by the guilds.67  Unlike 
in Venice, as the patent system in England came to the fore in the late 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there was no widespread artisan 
guild system that produced ordinary domestic innovations and could 
police the grant of patents.68  Coupled with the historical practice in 
England of focusing patent grants on the importation of established 
artisanal practices and their resultant manufactures from the Continent,69 
the less vigorous substantial novelty requirement in England becomes 
comprehensible. 
Second, the use of patents as positive privileges to allow independent 
inventors to compete with entrenched interests is not unique to the Venetian 
Republic.  Although patents today nominally provide mere negative rights 
to exclude, in practice, they often provide effective positive privileges to 
practice via “defensive” properties.  In some industries, the incumbents—
taken together—act as quasi-guilds, dominating production and sales 
through the cross-licensing of patents as well as more explicit knowledge-
sharing.70  To a certain extent, the “offensive” attributes of patents may 
allow startups and other potential entrants to break the grip of these modern-
day guilds by offering what has been called a “slingshot” for the small 
 
guilds enjoyed more staying power after the Statute of Monopolies, these merchants 
presumably did not have the requisite artisanal knowledge to police the granting of 
patents.  To be certain, the power of both the merchant and artisan guilds declined into 
the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the very time that the English patent 
system was on the rise.  See STELLA KRAMER, THE ENGLISH CRAFT GILDS AND THE 
GOVERNMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF THE ACCEPTED THEORY REGARDING THE DECAY OF 
THE ENGLISH CRAFT GILDS 139–47 (1905). 
 67. WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION 
OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 32 (1965). 
 68. See FREDERIC AUSTIN OGG, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN EUROPE 55–56 
(rev. ed. 1926); see also 2 WILLIAM ASHLEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH ECONOMIC 
HISTORY AND THEORY 66–189 (4th ed. 1906), available at http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/ 
econ/ugcm/3ll3/ashley/History2.pdf; ENGLISH GILDS, at clxi–clxiv (Toulmin Smith ed., 1870); 
KRAMER, supra note 66, at 139–47.  Another problem was that the English system, during the 
period in question, had no effective examination of patent applications; thus, any policing 
would have come at the litigation stage, presenting even greater barriers to guild intervention.  
See Duffy, supra note 60, at 30. 
 69. Cf. Duffy, supra note 60, at 27–28 (explaining the loss of the Venetian 
ingenuity requirement “as collateral damage from the decades of abusive monopolies by 
the Crown”). 
 70. Cf. Merges, supra note 13 (contending that patent pools and guilds exhibit 
common features). 
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company “David” against the big company “Goliath.”71  In this sense, our 
challenge to the traditional view of patents-as-competition-dampeners is not 
only pertinent to historical accounts but also to the functioning and roles of 
the patent system today. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The traditional view of patents focuses on the trade-off between 
competition and innovation incentives.  Yet, at their origin in the Venetian 
Republic, patents functioned very differently.  In particular, they fostered 
competition—first by foreigners and soon thereafter by Venetian citizens—
with the entrenched guilds that otherwise were entitled to state-sanctioned 
monopolies.  Understanding the competition-promoting role of patents not 
only has profound implications for historical accounts but also for our 
modern-day views of patents. 
 
 
 71. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
